Bargaining Equilibrium in a Non-Stationary Environment by Melvyn G. Coles & Abhinay Muthoo
Bargaining Equilibrium in a Non-Stationary
Environment
by







Abstract. In this paper we study an alternating-oers bargaining model in
which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but
smooth manner. In general there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria.
However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive oers
becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, and more importantly, we derive a powerful characterization of the unique
(limiting) subgame perfect equilibrium payos, which should prove especially useful
in applications. We then explore the circumstances under which Nash's bargaining
solution implements this bargaining equilibrium. Finally, we extend our results to the
case when the players have time-varying inside options.
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There is a large literature on decentralised trade in frictional markets where the terms
of trade are determined by bargaining. Typically the matching literature adopts the
static Nash bargaining approach to determine the terms of trade; see, for example,
Pissarides (1990). This is clearly reasonable in steady state situations where payos
do not change over time. But the matching literature frequently considers non-steady
state equilibria. For example, it might assess the transitional impact of some change
in government policy on market behaviour. In such dynamical equilibria, the terms of
trade will change over time. But unless those price changes are dynamically consistent,
the predicted transitional equilibrium dynamics will make little sense.
The critical advantage of the Rubinstein approach (cf., Rubinstein (1982)) over the
static Nash bargaining approach is that by explicitly describing a bargaining game,
it can identify dynamically consistent trading prices outside of steady state. This
paper formally reconsiders the original Rubinstein alternating oers bargaining game,
but without the stationarity assumption. Instead payos are assumed to evolve in a
reasonably arbitrary, though deterministic, manner. The focus is on considering the
limiting properties of these equilibria as , the time interval between two consecutive
oers, becomes small. It is shown that this approach is surprisingly tractable and
should be adopted in matching equilibria where agents face a truly dynamic bargaining
problem.
Throughout we retain the standard assumptions made in the bargaining literature
| that of concave, shrinking and vanishing Pareto frontiers | but allow the set of
possible utility pairs to evolve through time in a non-stationary manner. Binmore
(1987, Section 6) also considers this case and shows through an example that for any
 > 0; a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) is possible. His example
implies that once the stationarity assumption is dropped, the indeterminacy of the
bargaining problem may re-appear. It also suggests that the set of equilibria may not
converge to anything useful as  ! 0:
Although we drop the stationarity assumption, we also require that the Pareto frontiers
evolve smoothly through time. As in Binmore (1987), multiple SPE are possible for
any given  > 0; but we show that as  ! 0; the set of SPE necessarily converges
to a unique (limiting) SPE. This is quite nice, because | for well-known reasons (cf.,
for example, Binmore (1987, Section 8) and Muthoo (1999, Section 3.2.4)) | this
limiting case is perhaps the most persuasive one to focus attention upon. Further, the
1limiting outcome is described by a simple dierential equation which has convenient
geometric properties.
Of course, as using the static Nash bargaining approach is simpler, one might prefer
using it in a dynamic framework. But as Coles and Wright (1998) demonstrate, using
the Rubinstein-type approach to determine the terms of trade is not only tractable for
dynamic applications, it also supports qualitatively dierent equilibrium behaviour.
They consider a monetary economy where should a buyer and seller meet, they nego-
tiate over some `pie'. By agreeing some partition (xb;xs), each obtains instantaneous
payo u(xi), i = b;s. But these traders do not then exit the market. Instead they
exchange money and return to the market. If vi(t) denotes the expected payo to an
unmatched agent i (i = b;s) at time t in a market equilibrium, then the payo to
reaching agreement xi at time t (discounted back to time zero) is e rt[u(xi) + v i(t)]:
The critical feature is that non-steady state implies that the shape of the pie is time-
varying; i.e., the Pareto frontier describing the set of ecient agreements evolves
non-homothetically over time | the bargaining problem is non-stationary. Coles and
Wright (1998) demonstrate that in the continuous time limit, monetary equilibria with
strategic bargaining can exhibit trading cycles. In contrast, trading cycles are ruled
out by the static Nash bargaining approach. This is worrisome as the primary insight
is that monetary trade with market frictions is potentially destabilising | the value of
money depends on what you expect others will trade for it in the future. Strategic bar-
gaining generates dynamically consistent trading prices | the equilibrium partition
at time t depends on future vi. This is not the case with a myopic Nash bargaining
rule.
Clearly such dynamic consistency issues will arise in any matching equilibria where
agents do not leave the market after trade. For example, consider the real estate
market where the government increases interest rates. In a non-competitive market,
this might aect the market equilibrium | say fewer will choose to move house. If the
house seller is also trying to buy a house elsewhere, the fall in turnover may change
this seller's trading options and so change the value of the sale to the seller. Such
equilibrium eects change the `shape' of the pie and outside of a steady state, agents
should anticipate how the market might change over time and use that information
when bargaining over price.
This paper essentially claries and extends the arguments of Coles and Wright (1998)
in three important ways. First, Coles and Wright (1998) did not establish that their
`dierential equation' describes the limiting equilibrium to the bargaining game as
2 ! 0. They simply assumed it to be the case. This is not obvious given Binmore's
continuum example. We establish a formal Convergence Theorem assuming the Pareto
frontiers evolve smoothly through time.
Second, Coles and Wright (1998) provide a uniqueness argument which applies only
to a special case; that the payos are additively separable (i.e., are of the form
ui(x) + vi(t)) and that the vi(t) converge to some limit as t ! 1. We do not impose
these restrictions, especially as the latter would require that the underlying market
equilibrium converges to a steady state (which is formally inconsistent with their limit
cycle example, and to extended models which allow for say endogenous growth and/or
technology shocks). In particular, we believe our uniqueness proof is quite powerful
and expect it will generalise to other more complicated cases. The argument is based
on a Liapunov-type function whose structure is closely related to the Nash bargaining
product.
Finally, this paper provides a nice geometric interpretation for the limiting equilibrium
which shows how the strategic bargaining approach and the Nash bargaining approach
are properly related.
Other related work includes Merlo and Wilson (1995) and Cripps (1998). Those pa-
pers assume two agents negotiate over some pie (x1;x2) satisfying x1+x2  Mt; where
if agreement is reached at time t, agent i's payo is e rtui(xi): If Mt evolves deter-
ministically, then that preference structure is a special case of those considered in this
paper | it describes a one-shot bargaining game where given agreement, the traders
then exit the market for good. In essence, those papers describe an optimal tree-felling
problem where Mt evolves over time according to an (exogenous, stationary) Markov
process. The frameworks are related but the issues are quite distinct. Indeed, Merlo
and Wilson (1995) establish uniqueness of equilibrium for any  > 0, which is not the
case with non-stationary bargaining.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay down the model, and
in Section 3 we analyze its SPE. Then, in Section 4 we study the relationship between
the unique (limiting) SPE payo pair and Nash's bargaining solution. An application
of our results to a bargaining situation in which the players have time-varying discount
rates is provided in Section 5. In Section 6 we extend our results to the case when the
players have time-varying inside options. We conclude in Section 7.
32 The Model
Two players, A and B, bargain according to an alternating-oers procedure, where
the set 
(t) of possible utility pairs available at time t is a non-empty subset of <2.
Bargaining begins at time s, where the players negotiate according to the following
procedure. At time s + n (where n 2 N  f0;1;2;:::g, and  > 0), player i makes
an oer to player j (j 6= i), where i = A if n is even (i.e., n = 0;2;4;6;:::) and i = B
if n is odd (i.e., n = 1;3;5;:::). An oer at time s+n is a utility pair (uA;uB) from
the set 
(s + n). Player j then decides whether to accept or reject the proposed
oer. If she accepts the oer, then the bargaining game ends. Otherwise,  time units
later, at time s + (n + 1), player j makes a counteroer to player i. This process
of making oers and counteroers continues until an oer is accepted, at which point
the game ends with agreement being secured on some utility pair.
The payos are as follows. If the players reach agreement at time s+n (where n 2 N)
on (uA;uB) 2 
(s + n), then player i's (i = A;B) payo is ui. On the other hand,
if the players perpetually disagree (i.e., each player always rejects any oer made to
her), then each player obtains a payo of zero.
Let 
P(t) denote the Pareto frontier at time t | that is, the set of Pareto ecient util-
ity pairs available at time t.1 We assume that 
P(t) is a connected set. Furthermore,
there exists  ut
A > 0 and  ut
B > 0 such that (0;  ut
B) 2 
P(t) and ( ut
A;0) 2 
P(t). For
convenience, we describe this frontier by a function  where uB = (uA;t) if and only
if (uA;uB) 2 
P(t). Notice that (by the denition of Pareto eciency)  is strictly
decreasing in uA for all uA 2 [0;ut
A]. The following two assumptions are standard in
the literature:
Assumption 1 (Concave Pareto Frontiers). For each t  0, (:;t) is concave in
uA on the interval [0;  ut
A].
Assumption 2 (Shrinking and Vanishing Pareto Frontiers). (i) For any t  0
and uA 2 [0;  ut
A], (uA;t) < (uA;t0) for all t0 < t, and (ii) for any  > 0 there exists
a T > 0 such that  ut
A <  and  ut
B <  for all t > T.
Our third assumption replaces the (standard) stationarity assumption | we only
1By denition, a utility pair (uA;uB) 2 
P(t) if and only if (uA;uB) 2 
(t) and there does not
exist an alternative utility pair (u0
A;u0
B) 2 
(t) such that for each i = A;B, u0
i  ui, and for some i
(i = A or i = B), u0
i > ui.
4require that the Pareto frontier evolves smoothly over time:
Assumption 3 (Smoothly Evolving Pareto Frontiers).  is continuously dier-
entiable in t and uA.
As Assumption 1 implies that (for any t)  is dierentiable in uA almost everywhere,
the main role of Assumption 3 is that it ensures that the time derivative exists |
the Pareto frontier evolves smoothly over time. This plays no role when  > 0, but
implies \asymptotic smoothness" in the limit as  ! 0.
3 Characterizing Equilibria
Given  > 0, Binmore (1987, Section 6) constructs an example which demonstrates
that a continuum of SPE are possible. Here, using Assumptions 1-3, we focus on
characterizing the set of equilibria in the limit as  ! 0. By restricting attention to
Markov SPE, we rst establish that as  ! 0; all Markov SPE converge to the same
limiting SPE, and provide a complete characterization of that limiting SPE. It is then
established that all non-Markov SPE must also converge to the same limiting SPE.
Hence we can conclude that the limiting SPE exists and is unique.
Before restricting attention to Markov SPE, note that in any SPE of any subgame
beginning at any time t, player i's (i = A;B) equilibrium payo lies between zero and
 ut
i.
3.1 Markov Equilibria: Characterization and Existence
For any  > 0, we rst characterize the set of all Markov SPE. As the argument is
well-known (see Binmore (1987)), we quickly sketch the appropriate details.
Let  i (i = A;B) denote the set of times at which player i has to make an oer. That
is,
 A = fs;s + 2;s + 4;:::g and  B = fs + ;s + 3;s + 5;:::g;
and dene   =  A [  B.
Now consider an arbitrary Markov SPE. For each t 2  , let v(t) = (vA(t);vB(t)) (where
5v(t) 2 
(t)) denote the equilibrium oer made at time t. It is straightforward to show
that for any t 2  , the equilibrium oer v(t) is accepted.2 This implies that at any
time t 2  i (i = A;B), in equilibrium player j (j 6= i) accepts an oer (uA;uB) 2 
(t)
if and only if uj  vj(t + ). It thus follows that the equilibrium oer v(t) at time
t 2  i satises two standard properties, which are formally stated below in equations 1
and 2. Equation 1 states that in equilibrium player j is indierent between accepting
and rejecting player i's equilibrium oer v(t) made at time t 2  i, and equation 2
states that the equilibrium oer v(t) lies on the Pareto frontier.
vj(t) = vj(t + ) for t 2  i (j 6= i) (1)
vB(t) = (vA(t);t): (2)
For t 2  A; these equations imply that the sequence hvA(t)it2 A must satisfy the
following recursive equation:
(vA(t);t) = (vA(t + 2);t + ): (3)
Furthermore, as was noted above, it must also satisfy the following condition:
vA(t) 2 [0;  u
t
A] for all t 2  A: (4)
This argument implies the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 (Characterization of Markov SPE). Fix  > 0. Given any se-
quence hvA(t)it2 A satisfying (3) and (4), there corresponds a unique Markov SPE,
with the following pair of strategies:
 At time t 2  A player A oers (vA(t);(vA(t);t)), and at times t 2  B she accepts
an oer u 2 
(t) if and only if uA  vA(t + ).
 At times t 2  B player B oers (vA(t + );(vA(t + );t)), and at times t 2  A
she accepts an oer u 2 
(t) if and only if uB  (vA(t + 2);t + ).
There exists no other Markov SPE.
This proposition implies that a Markov SPE exists if and only if a sequence hvA(t)it2 A
satisfying (3) and (4) exists. By slightly amending the arguments used in Binmore
2Assumption 2(i) and the restriction to Markov strategies imply no delay in equilibrium.
6(1987), it is straightforward to establish that such a sequence always exists, and hence
a Markov SPE exists.3
Proposition 2 (Existence of Markov SPE). For any  > 0 there exists a Markov
SPE.
As Binmore (1987) demonstrates, multiple solutions to (3) and (4) may exist as (3)
does not contain an unstable forward looking root. However, we now focus on the set
of Markov SPE in the limit as  ! 0:
3.2 A Candidate Limiting Equilibrium
To emphasize the dependence of the set of Markov SPE on , it is helpful to dene
the following sets. For each  > 0, let F() denote the set of all sequences hvA(t)it2 A
which satisfy (3) and (4).4 Moreover, for each  > 0, let G() denote the set of all
Markov SPE payos to player A. Formally,
G() = fuA : there exists a sequence hvA(t)it2 A 2 F() s.t. vA(s) = uAg:
Of course, as  changes, the set G() changes. In Section 3.3 below we provide a
formal convergence theorem: in the limit as  ! 0, the set G() converges to a single
point, denoted by v
A(s). We rst describe v
A(s).
Fix  > 0 and an arbitrary Markov SPE, as characterized by an element of the set
F(). Using Assumption 3, a rst-order Taylor expansion of equation 3 implies
(vA(t + 2);t + ) = (vA(t);t) +

vA(t + 2)   vA(t)

u(vA(t);t)
+t(vA(t);t) + R; (5)
where u and t denote the rst-order derivatives of  w.r.t. uA and t, respectively,
and R is the remainder term. Using (3) to substitute for (vA(t + 2);t + ) in (5),
3A proof is available upon request.
4Notice that it follows from Proposition 1 that, for any  > 0, the set of Markov SPE are
essentially dened by the set F(). Furthermore, notice that Proposition 2 implies that this set is
non-empty.
7rearranging and dividing by 2, it follows that











If we could argue that the ratio of the remainder term to  disappears in the limit
as  ! 0, we might interpret (6) as a dierential equation describing how player A's
equilibrium payo changes over time in the limiting equilibrium. We dene such a
solution as our candidate limiting equilibrium:



















subject to vA(s) 2 [0;  u
s
A] for all s  0: (9)
Notice that the CLE describes a path (v
A(s);v
B(s)) for all s; while in the previous
section s was xed, but arbitrary. We now establish two results: (i) a CLE exists, and
(ii) the CLE is unique.
Lemma 1 (Existence). A CLE exists.
Proof. In the Appendix.
Establishing uniqueness is much less straightforward. As the underlying dierence
equation (3) does not contain an unstable forward looking root, it should be no surprise
that the corresponding dierential equation (8) does not contain an unstable forward
looking root. Nonetheless, the CLE is unique (given Assumptions 1{3). Furthermore,
an interesting feature of the proof is that it relies on constructing a Liapunov-type
function whose structure is closely related to that of the Nash-product (which, recall,
is a key object in the denition of the Nash bargaining solution). Indeed, the proof of
the Convergence Theorem stated below relies on the same construction.
8Lemma 2 (Uniqueness). The CLE is unique.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists two or more solutions which satisfy
the dierential equation in (8) subject to (9). Let x
1(:) and x
2(:) denote two arbitrary
such solutions such that for some s0  0, x
1(s0) 6= x












i(s);s) (i = 1;2).5 Dierentiating 	 with respect to s and using











































Hence, by concavity of  (Assumption 1) and  decreasing in t (Assumption 2), it
follows that for any s  0, 	0(s)  0. Since 	(s0) > 0, this implies that lims!1 	(s) >
0. Using Assumption 2, the condition in (9) implies that for each i = 1;2, x
i(s) ! 0
as s ! 1. This implies that lims!1 	(s) = 0. Hence, we have a contradiction.
3.3 The Unique Limiting Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
The aim now is to show that in the limit as  ! 0, any Markov SPE converges to
the CLE. We then establish that in this limit, any non-Markov SPE also converges to
the CLE.
Theorem 1 (The Convergence Theorem). Fix an arbitrary s. For any  > 0
there exists   such that for all  <  
max
uA2G()
j uA   v

A(s) j< :
Proof. In the Appendix.
5It should be noted that since x
i(s) satises (9), (x
i(s);s) is well-dened.
9Theorem 1 implies that the Hausdor distance between the set G() and fv
A(s)g
converges to zero as  ! 0. Hence in this limit, all Markov SPE imply agreement
occurs immediately, and the terms of trade are (v
A(s);v
B(s)): The nal step is to show
that in this limit any non-Markov SPE also converges to the CLE.
Theorem 2 (Unique Limiting SPE). In the limit as  ! 0, any SPE converges
to the CLE.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In summary, we have established that in the limit as  ! 0, our bargaining game pos-
sesses a unique SPE. In this limiting SPE, agreement is struck immediately (without
any delay), at the time s when the negotiations begin. Player A's equilibrium payo
is v
A(s), where v
A(:) is the unique solution of the dierential equation (8) subject to
(9), and player B's equilibrium payo is v
B(s) = (v
A(s);s).
We refer to condition (8) as the fundamental bargaining equation (FBE). In general,
nding the equilibrium payos (v
A(s);v
B(s)) will be a non-trivial problem as it is
described by a non-linear dierential equation. But it has a simple property. It








The right-hand side of (10) is the marginal rate of utility substitution along the Pareto
frontier at the equilibrium outcome. The left-hand side describes the marginal rate
of utility loss by delay at the equilibrium outcome. Strategic bargaining implies these
two trade-os are equalized. Geometrically, it implies that the slope of the CLE
(v
A(s);v
B(s)) at time s equals the absolute value of the slope of the Pareto frontier

P(s) at that point.
4 The Relationship with Nash's Bargaining Solu-
tion
As is well known, the unique SPE of Rubinstein's (1982) bargaining model can be
described by the Nash bargaining solution of an appropriately dened bargaining
10problem (cf., for example, Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Muthoo (1999)). Here
our objective is to extend this result (where possible) to the non-stationary bargaining
environments.





B(s)) = arg max
(uA;uB)2
(s)
(uA   dA(s))(uB   dB(s));
where (dA(s);dB(s)) is the as yet unspecied disagreement point. If the disagreement
point (dA(s);dB(s)) = (0;0) then the NBS (vN
A(s);vN
B(s)) is the unique solution of the
following pair of equations:




In contrast to (10), the NBS picks a point on the Pareto frontier where the absolute
value of the slope of the frontier at that point equals the slope of the line joining the
disagreement point (0;0) and the NBS. The following lemma establishes conditions
under which the NBS and the limiting SPE payo pair coincide for all s.
Lemma 3. The NBS (vN
A(s);vN
B(s)) with disagreement point (0,0) is identical to the
limiting SPE payo pair (v
A(s);v
B(s)) for all s if and only if u(v
A(s);s) is constant
for all s:
Proof. In the Appendix.
If u(v
A(s);s) is constant for all s, it follows from (10) that the locus (v
A(s);v
B(s))
describes a straight line, while (9) implies that line passes through the origin. This
of course then corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution | a ray out of the origin
with slope equal to the absolute value of the Pareto frontier.
The condition which guarantees that the strategic bargaining solution describes a ray
out of the origin is that the Pareto frontier shrinks homothetically. If the Pareto
frontier is now described by the implicit function
b (uA;uB;t) = 1;
then homotheticity requires that b  is separable in t and homogeneous in uA and uB;
11i.e., b  = (uA;uB)b (t) and  is homogeneous. Thus we obtain a Pareto frontier of the
form
(uA;uB) = (t); (13)
for some (t). Obviously, we must assume that  and  are consistent with As-
sumptions 1{3. Homotheticity now requires that the time component also aects the
players equally over time. As the example below demonstrates, they must have the
same discount rate.
Proposition 3 (Nash Equivalence under Homotheticity). If the Pareto fron-
tier shrinks homothetically, then the NBS with disagreement point (0,0) and the unique
limiting SPE payo pair coincide for all s.
Proof. In the Appendix.
If homotheticity is satised, then the limiting SPE payo pair and the NBS coincide.
Further, as the payos coincide with a static optimisation problem, the limiting SPE
payo pair is \myopic" | it does not depend on the rate at which the Pareto frontier
shrinks.
5 A Worked Example
To illustrate the Fundamental Bargaining Equation, we quickly consider a simple,
non-homothetic example. Suppose players A and B are bargaining over the partition
of a unit size cake, where negotiations begin at time s = 0. Player i's payo from








and ri(z) > 0 denotes i's instantaneous rate of time preference at time z. As xA+xB =







12Assuming ri nite and bounded away from zero, Assumptions 1{3 are satised and
hence Theorems 1 and 2 apply. Notice that unless rA = rB almost everywhere; the
Pareto Frontier does not shrink homothetically and so a Nash Bargaining solution
cannot be applied. Instead we have to solve directly the FBE. As the Pareto Frontier








vA[rA(s)   rB(s)] + rB(s)A(s)

:


















satises the FBE and (9). Hence, putting s = 0, the unique limiting (as  ! 0)













The unique (limiting) equilibrium share to player A is a discounted weighting of the
dierence between the players' discount rates in the entire future. The more impatient
player B is, the higher the payo to player A. Of course, if they have equal discount
rates then the bargaining game is perfectly symmetric and they split the cake.
6 An Extension to Time Varying Inside Options
The previous sections have assumed that the pie evolves over time in a non-stationary
way. But a dierent class of problems arise if the agents' inside options are time
varying. For example, when bargaining with a striking union, the rm might sell
out of its inventory of nished goods where such sales reduce the cost of the strike
to the rm; see, for example, Coles and Hildreth (2000). A dierent example is an
unemployed worker who is bargaining with a rm for a job and who receives duration
dependent unemployment insurance payments. The purpose of this section is to extend
the previous results for time varying inside options and so demonstrate the robustness
of this approach.
Two players, A and B, bargain according to the alternating-oers procedure as previ-
13ously described. An oer at time t is a utility pair (uA;uB) from the set 
(t); where
uB = (uA;t) describes the Pareto frontier. If the oer is rejected then over the in-
tervening period, player i obtains ow payo fi(t)  0 (which is measured in period
zero utils; i.e., it is discounted back to time zero).6 Dene di(t) =
R 1
t fi(z)dz  0,
which is player i's discounted payo at time t should they never reach agreement.
Assumption 10 (Concave Pareto Frontiers). For each t  0, (:;t) is concave in
uA on the interval [dA(t);  ut
A].
Assumption 20 (Positive, Shrinking and Vanishing Pareto Frontiers). (i) For
any t  0; dB(t) < (dA(t);t), (ii) for any t  0 and uA 2 [dA(t);  ut
A], t(uA;t) +
fB(t)   u(uA;t)fA(t) < 0, and (iii) for any  > 0 there exists a T > 0 such that
 ut
A <  and  ut
B <  for all t > T.
Assumption 30 (Smoothly Evolving Pareto Frontiers).  is continuously dif-
ferentiable, and fA;fB are continuous.
Condition (i) in Assumption 20 implies that there is always some partition both players
would prefer rather than never reach agreement | a gain to trade always exists.7 This
implies 0  di(t) < ut
i for all t and i = A;B: Condition (ii) is the appropriate shrinking
pie condition. To see why, suppose rather than agree some (Pareto ecient) partition
(uA;uB) at time t, the agreement is deferred to t + dt. Player A is no worse o as
long as the partition (u0
A;u0
B) at time t + dt satises fA(t)dt + u0
A  uA: As player
B's maximal payo is (u0
A;t+dt)+fB(t)dt, then the stated condition (ii) guarantees
delay makes player B strictly worse o.
Again consider an arbitrary Markov SPE where v(t) = (vA(t);vB(t)) denotes the
equilibrium oer made at time t 2  . As before shrinking pie and Markov strategies
imply there is no delay in equilibrium. Hence the equilibrium oer v(t) at time t 2  i
satises
vj(t) = fj(t) + vj(t + ) for t 2  i(j 6= i)
vB(t) = (vA(t);t);
6For example, if player i obtains UI payments b(t); then his/her ow payo during disagreement
might be described as fi = e rtui(b(t)).
7This assumption is convenient rather than critical. If it does not hold, then shrinking pie implies
a (unique) T where dB(T) = (dA(T);T): A gain to trade then exists for t < T; but not for t > T.
As equilibrium implies no trade for t  T; we would then use backward induction from t = T with
boundary condition vi(T) = di(T):
14where the rst condition says the proposer extracts maximal rents from the responder,
and the second says the oer is Pareto ecient. For any t 2  A; these equations imply
the dierence equation
(vA(t);t) = fB(t) + (fA(t + ) + vA(t + 2);t + ):
As before, our main interest is characterising the limiting equilibria as  ! 0: A rst
order Taylor expansion implies
0 = fB(t) + [fA(t + ) + vA(t + 2)   vA(t)]u + t + R:
Rearranging and taking the limit  ! 0 suggests that a candidate limiting equilibrium
(CLE) is a pair of functions (vA(:);vB(:)) such that for all s  0, vB(s) = (vA(s);s),






[fB(s) + fA(s)u(vA;s) + t(vA;s)]
u(vA;s)
; (14)
subject to vA(s) 2 [dA(s);
 1(dB(s);s)] for all s  0:
There are several points. First Assumption 20(ii) (shrinking pie) and (14) imply
dvA=ds + fA(s) < 0; along the CLE, delay always makes player A worse o. Also,
using dvB=ds = u(vA;s)dvA=ds+t(vA;s), it follows that dvB=ds+fB(s) < 0. Delay
makes both players strictly worse o.




which implies the geometric interpretation obtained previously. dvB=ds + fB(s) is
the (rate of) utility gain to player B through delay (which is negative). Strategic
bargaining implies the marginal rate of utility loss by delay at the equilibrium outcome
equals the marginal rate of utility substitution along the Pareto frontier.
Establishing existence of a solution to (14) is straightforward. The key is to note that
the previous expression can also be written as
d
ds (vB   dB)
d
ds (vA   dA)
=  u(vA;s):
15At each point in time, strategic bargaining shares the increase in surplus by reaching
agreement today rather than deferring another instant, where the ratio depends on the
slope of the Pareto frontier. By dening \surplus" variables b x  vA dA;b y  vB  dB;
the proof of lemma 1 can be applied to establish existence of a solution where b x; b y > 0
for all s (as required).8
To establish uniqueness, suppose there exist (at least) two solutions to (14) which we
denote x1(s);x2(s). Further, let yi(s) = (xi(s);s) and dene
	(s) =  [x1   x2][y1   y2];
where xi = xi(s);yi = yi(s). Note that 	(s) > 0 if x1 6= x2 and vanishing pie requires











and as the CLE implies y0
i(s)+fB =  u(xi;s)[x0
i(s)+fA]; we can substitute out the
y0




1 + fA][y2   [y1 + (x2   x1)u(x1;s)]]
+[x
0
2 + fA][y1   [y2 + (x1   x2)u(x2;s)]]:
As an equilibrium solution implies x0(s)+fA < 0 (see above), then concavity of  with
respect to u implies 	0(s)  0 which is the required contradiction. In the same way
we can adapt the limiting argument demonstrated in the proof of Theorem 2 and so
establish the corresponding Convergence Theorem.
6.1 An Important Special Case
There is one special case for which a simple (dynamically consistent) solution exists.
It is also a case that occurs frequently in the matching literature | that all agents
are assumed to be risk neutral and have common discount rate r > 0: Together these
8In particular, dene b (x;s)  (x+dA(s);s) dB(s): Then Pareto eciency implies b y = b (b x;s),
and the CLE implies
db y=ds
db x=ds =  b x(b x;s): Further, given ;di satisfy Assumptions 10   30; direct
inspection shows that b  satises Assumptions 1-3. Hence the proof of Lemma 1 implies a path exists
where b x; b y > 0 for all s.
16assumptions imply the Pareto frontier is of the form
uB + uA = (t)
where  is a positive constant and  is a positive, decreasing function. As u   ;






[fB(s)   fA(s) + 
0(s)]; (15)
which with a vanishing frontier (e.g. positive discounting and bounded payos) implies
the (unique) bargaining solution
vA(s) = dA(s) +
1
2
[(s)   dA(s)   dB(s)]
vB(s) = dB(s) +
1
2
[(s)   dA(s)   dB(s)];
where, as previously dened, the di(s) are the player's expected discounted payos by
never reaching agreement. Risk neutrality and common discount rates implies each
player receives an equal share of the pie, net of the `threatpoints' di(s). Note this
solution is `static' in the sense that it is described by a Nash bargaining product, but
replicates the dynamically consistent outcome to the strategic bargaining game given
appropriately dened (dynamic) threatpoints.
7 Conclusion
This paper has extended the Rubinstein bargaining model to a non-stationary en-
vironment. Although in general, multiple equilibria are possible for  > 0, it has
been established that with an appropriate continuity assumption, equilibrium is al-
ways unique in the limit as  ! 0. Further that limiting equilibrium is described by
a dierential equation which has a simple geometric interpretation | at each point in
time, equilibrium shares the increase in surplus by reaching agreement today rather
than deferring another instant, where the ratio depends on the slope of the Pareto fron-
tier. As Coles and Wright (1998) establish, when embedded in an extended matching
framework, this property results in a tractable dynamical structure. Indeed, using
this bargaining approach to extend that same monetary framework, Ennis (1999) also
establishes the existence of sunspot equilibria.
17Although aggregate dynamics are one source of non-stationary inuences on the bar-
gaining problem, a second source is that of time-varying inside options. We have shown
that the same techniques apply, and qualitatively identical results are obtained for this
case. Further, a useful simplication is obtained when all are assumed to be risk neu-
tral and have a common discount rate. This case is standard in the non-steady-state
matching literature; see, for example, Diamond and Fudenberg (1989), Boldrin, Kiy-
otaki and Wright (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Lagos and Violante (1998),
and Mortensen (1999). For this particular case, the equilibrium outcome to the bar-
gaining game reduces to a Nash bargaining solution but with particular `threatpoints'
| the threatpoints are each individual's expected discounted payo should agreement
never be reached. This outcome seems particularly useful for future applications |
see Cripps (1998), and Coles and Hildreth (2000) for examples where the pie evolves
stochastically, or Coles and Masters (2000) for an equilibrium matching model where
worker skills decline while unemployed.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let b  : ( 1;  u0
A][0;1) ! < be any function such that (i) for any (x;s) 2 [0;  u0
A]
[0;1), b (x;s) = (x;s), (ii) b  is continuously dierentiable on its domain, and (iii) for
any (x;s) 2 ( 1;  u0










subject to x(s) 2 [0;  u
s
A] for all s  0: (A.2)
From the Fundamental Theorem of Dierential Equations, we know that for any initial
value x(0) = x0, where x0 2 [0;  u0
A], there exists a unique solution to the dierential
equation in A.1; let that solution be denoted by b x(s;x0). To prove Lemma 1, we show
an initial value x0 2 [0;  u0
A] exists such that b x(s;x0) satises A.2.
For any initial value x0 2 [0;  u0
A], a trajectory is denoted as fb x(s;x0);b y(s;x0)g, where
b y(s;x0) = b (b x(s;x0);s).
18Claim A.1. [Trajectories do not cross].
For any initial values x0 2 [0;  u0
A] and x0
0 2 [0;  u0
A] such that x0 > x0
0: b x(s;x0) >
b x(s;x0
0) and b y(s;x0) < b y(s;x0
0) for all s  0.
This claim follows directly from the proof of Lemma 2 in the text. 	(s) as dened in
that proof is a measure of the distance between any two trajectories at any point in
time. The proof of lemma 2 shows this distance increases with s and so trajectories
never meet. We can see this directly by computing the slope of a trajectory in the
(x;y) plane. Direct calculation of db y(s;x0)=ds implies this slope is
db y(s;x0)=ds
db x(s;x0)=ds
=  b u(b x(s;x0);s)
which is strictly positive. The slope is equal in absolute value to the slope of the
graph of b (x;s) at (b x; b y;s). Concavity of  implies the slope of the trajectory is small
for small b x; and is large for large b x: As Figure 1 demonstrates, trajectories tend to
diverge over time. Further, as the slope of the trajectory is always strictly positive,
any trajectory fb x(s;x0);b y(s;x0)g either (i) intersects the x-axis in nite time, or (ii)
intersects the y-axis in nite time, or (iii) is always (strictly) in the positive quadrant.
Dene x = fx0 2 [0;  u0
A] : there exists an S such that b x(S;x0) > 0 and b y(S;x0) = 0g,
and y = fx0 2 [0;  u0
A] : there exists an S such that b x(S;x0) = 0 and b y(S;x0) > 0g.9
Furthermore, dene  = fx0 2 [0;  u0
A] : for all s  0, b x(s;x0) > 0 and b y(s;x0) > 0g.
Claim A.2 now shows that  is non-empty, which completes the proof of the Lemma.
Claim A.2.  is non-empty.
Proof of Claim A.2. By contradicton. Suppose to the contrary that  is empty.
This implies that x and y form a complete partition of [0;  u0
A]. Since 0 2 y and
 u0
A 2 x, these two sets are non-empty. Furthermore, since trajectories do not cross,
the respective supports of x and y are connected. Hence, since x and y partition
the interval [0;  u0
A], one of these two sets is closed. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that x is closed | that is, there exists xc 2 (0;  u0
A) such that x = [xc;  u0
A]. Hence,
there exists a corresponding S < 1 such that b x(S;xc) =  uS
A > 0 and b y(S;xc) = 0.
Now consider s = S + 1 and set x(S + 1) =  u
S+1
A and y(S + 1) = 0: By iterating
the dierential equation (A.1) backwards through time starting at s = S + 1 with
9That is, x and y are respectively the sets of initial values whose trajectories cross the x-axis
and y-axis.
19\initial" value x(S+1) =  u
S+1




0 2 x: But as trajectories cannot cross, this implies x0









Figure 1: Three typical trajectories of the dierential equation in A.1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Fix an arbitrary sequence hni such that n > 0 (for all n 2 N) and n ! 0 as
n ! 1. This denes a sequence hFni where Fn  F(n): Now dene a sequence hxni
where for each n 2 N, xn is an arbitrary element of Fn. That is, for each n 2 N; xn is
an arbitrary sequence hxn(t)it2 n
A that satises
(xn(t);t) = (xn(t + 2n);t + n) (A.3)
and xn(t) 2 [0;  ut
A] for all t 2  n
A; where  n
A   A(n) = fs;s + 2n;s + 4n;:::g.
We have to show that the sequence hxn(s)i converges to v
A(s).






B(t)   yn(t)]; (A.4)
where (v
A;v
B) is the unique CLE and yn(t) = (xn(t);t). One might interpret 	(n;t)
as a measure of the distance between the CLE (v
A(t);v
B(t)) and the SPE payo pair
(xn(t);yn(t)). In particular, 	(n;t) = 0 if and only if xn(t) = v
A(t); and 	(n;t) > 0
for xn(t) 6= v
A(t): Most importantly, by establishing that 	(n;s) ! 0 as n ! 1 it
follows that xn(s) ! v
A(s) in this limit. Hence we establish the Theorem by proving
that for any " > 0 there always exists an N such that 	(n;s) < " for all n > N:
Fix an arbitrary " > 0. If  us
A us
B  "=2, then 	(n;s)   us
A us
B  "=2 (for all n 2 N),
and we are done. Now suppose that " < 2 us
A us
B. Dene T such that  uT
A uT
B = "=2.
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply T exists, is unique and is strictly greater than s. Also
	(n;T)   uT
A uT
B = "=2 for all n 2 N. Furthermore, dene for each n 2 N,
Mn = minfm 2 N : m  (T   s)=2ng and Tn = s + 2Mnn:
Notice that Tn 2  n
A for all n 2 N. Further Tn  T, and Assumption 2 implies that





Now for any n 2 N,
	(n;s) = 	(n;Tn)  
Mn 1 X
i=0
[	(n;s + 2(i + 1)n)   	(n;s + 2in)]:
Claim A.3 | which is stated below | implies
	(n;s) = 	(n;Tn)  
Mn 1 X
i=0
[F(n;s + 2in)n + o(n)];
where o(n) denotes a remainder term that is of order smaller than n (i.e. o(n)=n
converges to zero as n ! 1). As Claim A.3 also implies F(n;t)  0 for all t 2  n
A;
this now implies




But Mn = 0(1=n) and so it follows that
PMn 1
i=0 o(n) converges to zero as n ! 1:
Hence there exists an N such that for any n > N, j
PMn 1
i=0 o(n) j< "=2. As
21	(n;Tn)  "=2, this implies 	(n;s) < " for all n > N (as required).
Claim A.3. For any n 2 N and t 2  n
A:
	(n;t + 2n)   	(n;t) = F(n;t)n + o(n);




























Furthermore, for any n 2 N and t 2  n
A: F(n;t)  0.
Proof of Claim A.3. As v
A : [0;1) ! < satises the dierential equation in (8), then











n + o(n): (A.5)
Further, Assumption 3 (dierentiability) implies that we can consider a rst order
Taylor expansion of (v
A(t + 2n);t + 2n) around (v
A(t);t), and A.5 then implies



















A(t);t) + o(n): (A.6)
Recalling that xn(t) satises A.3, Assumption 3 (dierentiability) implies that for any
n 2 N and t 2  n
A:
xn(t + 2n)   xn(t) =  
t(xn(t);t)
u(xn(t);t)
n + o(n): (A.7)
Now consider a rst order Taylor expansion of (xn(t+2n);t+2n) around (xn(t);t):
22A.7 then implies that for any n 2 N and t 2  n
A:
(xn(t + 2n);t + 2n) = (xn(t);t) +
h
xn(t + 2n)   xn(t)
i
u(xn(t);t)
+ 2nt(xn(t);t) + o(n): (A.8)
Given the denition of 	 in (A.4), and using (A.5){(A.8) to substitute out terms dated
at time t+2n, straightforward (but messy) algebra establishes the equations stated
in the Claim. F(n;t)  0 follows from the concavity of , and from t < 0 and u < 0.
Proof of Theorem 2
Fix  > 0. For each i = A;B and t 2  i, let Gi(t) denote the set of SPE payos to
player i in any subgame beginning at time t. Formally, Gi(t) = fgi : there exists an
SPE in any subgame beginning at time t (when player i makes an oer) that gives
player i a payo of gig. Since Gi(t) is bounded, we denote its supremum and inmum
by Mi(t) and mi(t), respectively.
It follows from Claim A.4 below that both the sequence hMA(t)it2 A and the sequence
hmA(t)it2 A are elements of the set F(). Theorem 1 implies that in the limit, as
 ! 0, the set F() converges to a unique element. Hence, it follows (by appealing
to Claim A.4) that in the limit, as  ! 0, the set of SPE payos to the players in any
subgame are uniquely dened: in the limit as  ! 0, any SPE in any subgame gives
player A a payo of v
A(s) and player B a payo of v
B(s). This implies that in any
limiting (as  ! 0) SPE, each player's oer (in any subgame when she has to make
an oer) is accepted by her opponent. Hence, it immediately follows that in the limit
as  ! 0, any SPE converges to the CLE.
Claim A.4. Fix  > 0. 8t 2  A, MA(t) =  1(mB(t + );t) and mA(t) =
 1(MB(t + );t), and 8t 2  B, MB(t) = (mA(t + );t) and mB(t) = (MA(t +
);t).
Proof of Claim A.4. The proof | which is available upon request | follows from a
straightforward adaptation of standard arguments (which are, for example, presented
in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, chapter 3) and Muthoo (1999, chapter 3)).
Proof of Lemma 3
We rst establish suciency. If u(v
A(s);s) is constant for all s, then (10) implies that
23the locus f(v
A(s);v
B(s)) : s  0g is a straight line, being a ray through the origin with




Hence, for all s the NBS and the limiting SPE payo pair are identical. We now
establish necessity. If vN
A(s) = v










for all s: (A.9)
Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists s00 > s0 such that u(v
A(s00);s00) 6= u(v
A(s0);s0).























Proof of Proposition 3


















where i  @=@ui. Homogeneity of  and (A.11) implies vN
B(t) = vN






Assumptions 1{3 guarantee a solution exists and is unique.10 Given that solution,
10Pick any point on the Pareto frontier.  is the slope of the line from the origin to this point,
while the right-hand side is the (absolute) slope of the Pareto frontier at this point. The right-hand
side is positive, decreasing in  and is continuous.
24vN






Direct inspection shows that this solution also satises (10) and therefore satises the
FBE.
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